Why Accomplice Evidence is Untrustworthy under Indian Evidence Act?

Accomplice evidence is untrustworthy for the following three reasons:

(1) An accomplice is likely to swear falsely in order to shift the guilt from himself.

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2) As a participator in crime, and consequently as an immoral person, he is likely to disregard the sanction of an oath.

(3) He gives evidence under a promise of a pardon or in the expectation of implied pardon, if he discloses all he knows against those with whom he acted criminally; and this hope would lead him to favour the prosecution. (Queen Empress v. Maganlal, (1889) 14 Bom. 115)

The emphatic statement in Section 133 that a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice may, at first sight, lead an inexperienced and untrained reader to suppose that the legislators desired to encourage convictions on the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice.

However, this is not so, because the law in Section 133 is qualified by a rule of caution and prudence in Illustration (b) to Section 114, where it is declared that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars. This rule of caution has thus now acquired the force of law.

The nature and extent of corroboration of accomplice evidence must necessarily vary with the circumstances of each case, and it is not possible to enunciate any hard and fast rule. But the guiding rules laid down in R. v. Baskerville (1916 2 К. B. 658) are clear beyond controversy. They are:

(1) It is not necessary that there should be independent confirmation, in every detail, of the crime related by the accomplice. It is sufficient if there is a confirmation as to a material circumstance of the crime.

(2) The confirmation by independent evidence must be of the identity of the accused in relation to the crime, i.e., confirmation of some fact which goes to fix the guilt of the particular person charged, by connecting or tending to connect him with the crime. In other words, there must be confirmation in some material particulars, that not only has the crime been committed, but that the accused has committed it.

(3) The corroboration must be independent testimony, that is, by some evidence other than that of the accomplice, and therefore, one accomplice cannot corroborate the other.

(4) The corroboration need not be by direct evidence that the accused committed the crime; it may even be circumstantial.

This rule has been confirmed by the Supreme Court in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, (1952 S.C. 54), and Vemmireddy v. State, (1956 S.C. 379).

It may also be noted that Rules No. (1) and (4) (above) were re­affirmed by the Supreme Court in S. v. Baswant, (1958 S.C. 500).

The same question came for consideration before the Supreme Court in Bhiva v. State of Maharashtra, (A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 599), in which it was held that the combined effect of S. 133 and S. 114; Illustration (b) may be stated as follows:

“According to the former, which is a rule of law, an accomplice is competent to give evidence, and according to the latter, which is a rule of practice, it is almost always unsafe to convict upon his testimony alone. Therefore, though the conviction of an accused on the testimony of an accomplice cannot be said to be illegal, yet the Courts will, as a matter of practice, not accept the evidence of such a witness without corroboration in material particulars. The corrobo­ration should be in material particulars and qua each accused.”

Problem:

A, a public servant, demanded with threats, a bribe from B. Upon information given by B, the police arranged a trap. A was caught red-handed in the act of accepting the bribe from В in the presence of C, a Panch witness. In the circumstances, can В and С be regarded as accomplices? Comment.

Ans:

В and С cannot be regarded as accomplices. Persons who have entered into a communication with conspirators, but who, either on account of a subsequent repentance, or an original determination to frustrate the enterprise, have disclosed the conspiracy to the public authorities, under whose direction they continue to act with their guilty confederates, till the matter can be so far matured as to ensure the conviction, cannot be treated as accomplices.

Persons who are present at the time of giving of bribes are also not accomplices. In the above case, В had no intention of giving a bribe. He was threatened and asked to give it. Therefore, a trap was laid to catch the bribe-taker red-handed. В had no criminal intention of committing the act.

The difference is that in the case of an accomplice, he acknowledges himself to be a criminal; in the case of these men, they do not acknowledge anything of the kind. В gave the money to the public servant, with the purpose of trapping him in the act of taking the bribe, and he did so in general public interest.

Therefore, he does not partake of the criminal contamination of an accomplice. As far as С is concerned, he is merely present at the time of the transaction. He does not take any part as such in the criminal act, and hence, he is not an accomplice.