Article 91: (The latter parts of the Arts, 48 and 49 and the former parts being covered by Arts. 68 and 69 of the Act of 1963):—
(a) The period of limitation for a suit for compensation for wrongfully, taking or detaining any specific movable property lost, or acquired by theft, or dishonest misappropriation or conversion is three years and the time of limitation starts to run from the date when the person having the right to the possession of the property first learns in whose possession it is.
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(b) The period of limitation for a suit for compensation for wrongfully taking or injuring or wrongfully detaining any other specific movable property is three years and the limitation commences when the property is wrongfully taken or injured, or when the detainer’s possession becomes unlawful.
The word ‘compensation’ in Art. 91 means anything given to make things equivalent; a thing given to or to make amends for loss, recompense, remuneration or pay; it need not necessarily be in terms of money. It can be assessed by way of value of the goods damaged or injured or damages consequential on the wrongful taking etc.
The Article 91 is attracted only when the property is wrongfully taken or wrongfully detained and compensation claimed therefore.
In Firm of S.P.A. v. National Steamship Co., (AIR 1958 Ker. 47), it has been held that the Article 91 will apply to a suit for compensation for non-delivery against a carrier when the defence was that the defendant company was the agent of the steamship company which were the actual carriers.
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In Dominion of India v Central Aerating Gas Co., (AIR 1964 All. ’ 243), it has been held that the Art. 91 would not apply to suits for compensation of wrongful injury to movable property while in the possession of the plaintiff and not in possession of any third party.
The Art. 91 does not attract suits for compensation for injuring specific movable property lost or acquired by theft or misappropriation.
The Art. 91 will not apply to cases for damages purely on breach of contract.
A suit for recovery of movable property in specie or in the alternative for damages is governed by Art. 91(a). Article 91(a) applies when the plaintiff is entitled to certain movable property and/or of which he is presently entitled to possession in specie and which the defendant has wrongfully taken from him and/or is illegally withholding from him.
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Art. 91(a) is attracted only when the movable property has been wrongfully taken or wrongfully detained or when such property is lost or when the same has been acquired by the defendant by theft or dishonest misappropriation or conversion.
In order to attract Art. 91(a) it is only necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant wrongfully took away or wrongfully retained movable which resulted in the loss of the owner of the movable. It is not necessary to prove that taking or retaining was not bona fide or dishonest.
In order to attract Art. 91(a) the plaintiff must have right to immediate possession of the movable at the time when the same was lost or acquired by theft or misrepresentation.
The limitation under Art. 91(a) starts from the date when the plaintiff having the right to possession first comes to know in whose possession it is and the onus is upon the plaintiff to prove that he acquired knowledge within three years prior to the date of filing the suit.
In Sudarsanamma v. Raghavaiah, [(1966) 1 Andh.WR 218)], it has been held that when the plaintiff filed the suit for compensation against the defendant for taking away mica from the plaintiffs mica mine after trespassing upon his mica mine the starting point of limitation is the date when the plaintiff first came to know of the encroachment and the taking away the mica but not when he came to know the details of the mica taken away.
To attract Art. 91(b), wrongfully taking is required to be proved which means depriving a person of the use of the property. Neither dishonesty nor any moral turpitude is required to be proved to attract Art. 91(b).
In Sukhdei v. Naipal Ram, (AIR 1974 All. 408), it has been held that where raw materials are supplied from time to time for manufacture and return of finished goods, a suit for compensation for non-return of the I materials, finished or unfinished, is governed by Art. 91(b), and time runs from the date when the defendant refused to return the material and also failed to pay compensation in respect thereof.
In Mangalji v. State of Rajasthan, (AIR 1971 Raj. 167), it has been held that the suit for compensation filed by the plaintiff against the Government occasioned by wrongful procurement of food-grains will be governed by the Art. 91(b).
In Dominion of India v. Central Aerating Gas Co., (AIR 1964 All. 243), it has been held that the expression “wrongfully injuring” used in Art. 91(b) applies only to a case of injury to movable property while it was in the custody of the person other than its owner.
In Union of India v. A.F. Pathan, (AIR 1960 Mys. 283), it has been held that a suit by the plaintiff for compensation as against the railway when there is illegal refusal by the railway to deliver the goods attracts the Art. 91(b).
In an action under Art. 91(b), the limitation starts from the time when the property is wrongfully taken or injured or when detainer’s possession becomes wrongful.