Homicide:
Homicide is the killing of a human being by a human being and culpable means criminal. Homicide may be lawful or unlawful. It is lawful where death is caused by accident without any criminal intention, or caused in the exercise of the right of private defence of person or property or by a person of unsound mind. Unlawful homicide includes culpable homicide not amounting to murder, rash or negligent homicide.
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Culpable Homicide:
Section 299 lays down that whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide?
Essential Elements:
ADVERTISEMENTS:
Its essential elements consist of the following, v/z., the causing of death by doing (i) an act with the intention of causing death; (ii) an act with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; or (iii) an act with the knowledge that it was likely to cause death.
A few illustrations will bring out the principles clearly: (a) A lays sticks and turf over a pit, with the intention of thereby causing death, or with the knowledge that death is likely to be caused thereby. Z believing the ground to be firm treads on it, falls in and is killed. A has committed the offence of culpable homicide; (b) A knows Z to be behind a bush.
B does not know it a intending to cause or knowing it to be likely to cause Z’s death, induces B to fire at the bush. B fires and kills Z. Here B may be guilty of no offence; but A has committed the offence of culpable homicide, (c) A, by shooting at a fowl with intent to kill and steal it, kills B, who is behind a bush, a not knowing that he was there. Here, although A was doing an unlawful act, he was not guilty of culpable homicide, as he did not intend to kill B or cause death by doing an act that he knew was likely to cause death.
The three Explanations to the Section provide:
(1) A person who causes bodily injury to another who is labouring under a disorder, disease or bodily infirmity, and thereby accelerates the death of that other, shall be deemed to have caused his death.
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(2) Where death is caused by bodily injury, the person who causes such bodily injury shall be deemed to have caused the death, although by resorting to proper remedies and skilful treatment th6 death might have been prevented.
The deceased was stabbed in the abdomen by a knife and he died of gangrene and paralysis of intestines. It was held that the fact that if an operation had taken place within an hour of the infliction of the abdominal injury the life of the deceased might have been saved, could not, in view of this Explanation, remove the offence from the ambit of culpable homicide.
(3) The causing of the death of a child, in the mother’s womb is not homicide. But it may amount to culpable homicide to cause the death of a living child if any part of that child has been brought forth, though the child may not have breathed or been completely born.
Murder:
Section 300,1.P.C. lays down that culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or secondly, if it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or thirdly, if it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or fourthly, if the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.
Illustrations:
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(1) A shoots Z with the intention of killing him. Z dies in consequence. A commits murder, (i) A knowing that Z, is labouring under such a disease that a blow is likely to cause his death, strikes him with the intention of causing bodily injury. Z dies in consequence of the blow. A is guilty of murder, although the blow might not have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of a person in a sound state of health.
But it is not murder if B had not known that Z was labouring under any disease, (ii) A intentionally gives Z a swords-cut sufficient to cause the death of a man in the ordinary course of nature. Z dies in consequence.
Here A is guilty of murder, although he may not have intended to cause Z’s death, (iv) A, without any excuse, fires a loaded cannon into a crowd of persons and kills one of them. A is guilty of murder, although he may not have had premeditated design to kill any particular individual.
The Supreme Court has in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab (A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 465) laid down that the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under S. 300 “thirdly”:
Firstly, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present;
Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; these are purely objective investigations;
Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say that it was not accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended.
Fourthly, it must be proved that injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.
Bose J. further observed: “Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and of course, the burden is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under S. 300 “thirdly’. It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death.
It does not matter that there was to intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature (not that there is any real distinction between the two). It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death.
Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.”
The Supreme Court had occasion to consider the same provisions in Laxman Kalu Nikalji v. The State of Maharashtra (A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1390). In that case a single injury was inflicted on the deceased with a knife 2″ below the outer 1/3 of right clavicle on the right side of the chest and penetrated to the depth of 4″ into the chest cavity.
Dealing with the question whether the offence would be covered by ‘thirdly’ of S. 300 of the Indian Penal Code. Hidayatullah, C.J. observed: “That section requires that the bodily injury must be intended and the bodily injury intended to be caused must be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
This clause is in two parts: the first is a subjective one which indicates that the injury must be an intentional one and not an accidental one, the second part is objective in that looking at the injury intended to be caused, the court must be satisfied that it was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.”
On the basis of the evidence it was held in the aforesaid case that the first part was complied with and the second part was not fulfilled because but for the fact that the injury caused the severing of artery, death might not have ensued and the injury which the accused intended to cause did not include specifically the cutting of the artery but to wound the victim in the neighbourhood of the clavicle. In these circumstances S. 300 ‘thirdly’ was held to be inapplicable.
Having regard to the fact that the appellant had used a dangerous weapon like a rifle (being a police constable he must have known that it was a dangerous weapon) and having regard to the fact that he had fired at Kaptan Singh as many as five shots, one of which was fired after Kaptan Singh was hit by a bullet and collapsed on the ground it was impossible to accept the contention that the appellant had not done the act with the intention of causing his death.
It was naive to argue that the intention was merely to frighten him or to cause grievous hurt for it overlooked the two salient features, viz., (a) as many as five shots were fired from his 303 rifle and (b) that he fired a shot even after Kaptan Singh had collapsed on the ground having been hit by one of the shots.
A bare glance at S. 300 of the Indian Penal Code would show that if the act is done with the intention of causing death, culpable homicide would be murder. Under clause 2ndly of S. 300 if the act is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused it would amount to murder.
When the appellant, a police constable fired from his 303 rifle (he must have known that it was a deadly weapon) no other inference is possible but that he intended to cause such bodily injury as he knew to be likely to cause death of the person to whom the harm was caused.
Clause 3rdly of S. 300 provides that if the act is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death it would amount to murder.
Again having regarded to the facts narrated hereinabove no other conclusion was possible except that the appellant intended to inflict such bodily injuries to the deceased which were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In any view of the matter it would fall under clause 4thly, which provided that if the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid it would amount to murder.
Illustrations:
(a), (c) and (d) of S. 300, I.P.C. reading as under may be flashed on the mental screen in order to reinforce this conclusion:
A shoots Z with the intention of killing him. Z dies in consequence. A commits murder.
(b) A intentionally gives Z a sword-cut or club-wound sufficient to cause the death of a man in the ordinary course of nature. Z dies in consequence. Here A is guilty of murder, although he may not have intended to cause Z’s death.
(c) A without any excuse fires loaded cannon into a crowd of persons and kills one of them. A is guilty of murder, although he may not have had a premeditated design to kill any particular individual.” [Sehaj Ram v. State of Haryana, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 614].