Section 23 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that:
As per Section 23 of the Limitation Act, 1963, in the case of a suit for compensation for an act which does not give rise to a cause of action unless some specific injury actually results there from, the period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the injury results.
Image Source: cdn2.hubspot.net
ADVERTISEMENTS:
The principle of Section 23 is that “where the cause of action lies, not in a specific act or omission, but in the resulting damage, the statute runs from the time when the plaintiff sustains the loss.
Section 23 applies to specific or local laws, unless expressly excluded as per Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
The Section 23 of the Limitation Act is applicable to suits based on both torts and contracts. It deals with a suit for compensation for an act which does not give rise to a cause of action. The expression ‘cause of action’ is not defined by the Limitation Act. However, it means every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove if traversed in order to support his right to the judgment of the court.
To avail the benefit of Section 23 of the Limitation Act, it must be proved that some specific injury has occurred to the plaintiff. The word ‘specific’ means that can be specified and the word ‘injury’ includes a legal injuries.
ADVERTISEMENTS:
Section 23 of the Limitation Act affects the time from which the time would run. All it says is that in a suit for compensation for an act not actionable without special damage. The period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the injury results. Therefore, the effect which this section causes in the operation of the situation of limitation is not to extend or to restrict any period of limitation, but to modify the date or time from which the cause arises.
Section 23 of the Limitation Act relates to an act which does not give rise to a cause of action unless some specific injury actually results there from. Where the wrongful act itself gives rise to a cause of act, Section 23 does not apply. In Abdulla v. Abdulla [AIR 1924 Bom. 290], the defendant threw sulphuric acid on the face of the plaintiff, which results in the loss of one of his eyes, the act of the defendant was itself sufficient to give rise to a cause of action for damage for personal injury. It is held that time would run from the date when the act of throwing sulphuric acid was committed and not from the date when the specific injury, (i.e., loss of eye) resulted.
Where the cause of action lies not in a specific act or omission but in resulting damages, the statute runs from the time when the plaintiff sustains the loss.
Each separate specific injury caused by an act constitutes fresh cause of action, and separate period of limitation will run for each. Time begins to run from the date on which the plaintiff becomes aware of the loss but the date on which the loss actually results.