Here is your speech on Murder:
Section 300 of Indian Penal Code defines “Murder”. Section 302 prescribes punishment. Murder is serious offence than culpable homicide. There is a great difference between culpable homicide and murder. Sec. 300 defines murder. It gives illustrations and exceptions.
Firstly:
Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or
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Secondly:
If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or
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Thirdly:
If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted if sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or
Fourthly:
If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death, or such injury as aforesaid.
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Illustrations:
(a) A shoots Z with the intention of killing him. Z dies in consequence. A commits murder.
(b) A, knowing that Z is labouring under such a disease that a blow is likely to cause his death, strikes him with the intention of causing bodily injury. Z dies in consequence of the blow. A is guilty of murder, although the blow might not have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of a person in a sound state of health.
But if A, not knowing that Z is labouring under any disease, gives him such a blow as would not in the ordinary course of nature kill a person in a sound state of health, here A, although he may intend to cause bodily injury, is not guilty of murder, if he did not intend to cause death or such bodily injury as in the ordinary course of nature would cause death.
(c) A intentionally gives Z a sword-cut, or club-wound sufficient to cause the death of a man in the ordinary course of nature. Z dies in consequence. Here A is guilty of murder, although he may not have intended to cause Z’s death.
(d) A without any excuse fires a loaded cannon into a crowd of persons and kills one of them. A is guilty of murder, although he may not have had a premeditated design to kill any particular individual.
Exception-1:
When culpable homicide is not murder:
Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident.
The above exception is subject to the following provisos:-
First:
That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person.
Secondly:
That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant.
Thirdly:
That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence.
Explanation:
Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact.
Illustrations:
(a) A, under the influence of passion excited by a provocation given by Z, intentionally kills Y, Z’s child. This is murder in as much as the provocation was not given by the child, and the death of the child was not caused by accident or misfortune in doing an act caused by the provocation.
(b) Y gives grave and sudden provocation to A. A, on this provocation, fires a pistol at Y, neither intending nor knowing himself to be likely to kill, Z, who is near him, but out of sight. A kills Z. Here A has not committed murder, but merely culpable homicide.
(c) A is lawfully arrested by Z, a bailiff. A is excited to sudden and violent passion by the arrest, and kills Z. This is murder inasmuch as the provocation was given by a thing done by a public servant in the exercise of his powers.
(d) A appears as a witness before Z, a Magistrate. Z says that he does not believe a word of A’s deposition, and that A has perjured himself. A is moved to sudden passion by these words and kills Z. This is murder.
(e) A attempts to pull Z’s nose. Z, in the exercise of the right of private defence, lays hold of A to prevent him from doing so. A is moved to sudden and violent passion in consequence, and kills Z. This is murder, inasmuch as the provocation was given by a thing done in the exercise of the right of private defence.
(f) Z strikes B. B, is by this provocation, excited to violent rage. A, a bystander, intending to take advantage of B’s rage, and to cause him to kill Z, puts a knife into B’s hand for that purpose. B kills Z with the knife. Here B may have committed only culpable homicide, but A is guilty of murder.
Exception-2:
Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise in good faith of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right of defence without premeditation, and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence.
Illustration:
Z attempts to horsewhip A, not in such a manner as to cause grievous hurt to A. A draws out a pistol, z persists in the assault. A believing in good faith that he can by no other means prevent himself from being horsewhipped shoots Z dead. A has not committed murder, but only culpable homicide.
Exception-3:
Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, being a public servant or aiding a public servant acting for the advancement of public justice, exceeds the powers given to him by law, and causes death by doing an act which he, in good faith, believes to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duty as such public servant and without ill-will towards the person whose death is caused.
Exception-4:
Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender’s having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
Explanation:
It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault.
Exceptions:
Culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused, being above the age of eighteen years, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent.
Illustration:
A, by instigation, voluntarily causes Z, a person under eighteen years of age, to commit suicide. Here, on account of Z’s youth, he was incapable of giving consent to his own death. A has, therefore, abetted murder.
Important Points:
A. Sec. 300 defines “Murder”. It also narrates culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Sec. 300 begins by setting out the circumstances when culpable homicide turns into murder which is punishable under Sec. 302.
There are five exceptions in Sec. 300. These five exceptions describe in detail along with illustrations when the offence is not murder but only culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
The deaths caused under the circumstances mentioned in these exceptions are punishable under Sec. 304. Murder is an aggravated form of culpable homicide. In the beginning of Section 300 itself, there are four conditions mentioned in Sec. 300, which turn culpable homicide into murder.
B. All murders are culpable homicides, but culpable homicides are not murders:
There are differences between culpable homicide and murder. The main element which is distinguishable from culpable homicide from murder is the presence of a special mens rea culpable homicides are punished under Sec. 304. Murder is punishable under Sec. 302. Sec. 302 imposes capital punishment. There are two kinds of punishments in Sec. 304, viz., Part-1 and Part-2.
C. An offence under Sec. 299 becomes an offence under Sec. 302, i.e., becomes murder, if it is committed with the intention or knowledge in the four clauses in Sec. 300.
If the requisite intention or knowledge under any of four clauses of Sec. 300 is not proved then the offence comes under Sec. 299, provided the intention or knowledge mentioned in the clauses (a) to (c) of Sec. 299.
D. Homicide may be culpable and culpable homicide may amount to murder. Murder (Sec. 300) can be said to be an aggravated form of culpable homicide (Sec. 299). Hence all murders are culpable homicides, but all culpable homicides are not murders.
If the killing comes within one of the four clauses of Sec. 300 (not falling within the exceptions), it is murder. In general, if the case comes within clause (a) of Sec. 299, it would amount to murder. If one of the special exceptions in the Sec. 300 applies the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
E. When culpable homicide is not murder?
There are five exceptions given in the Sec. 300. These five exceptions explain that in the circumstances mentioned in these exceptions, the accused is not held guilty of murder, but he would held guilty of culpable homicide.
F. Reg. vs. Govinda (ILR Bomb. Vol. 1,1876 – 342)
Brief Facts: This case is famous for showing the distinction between ‘murder’ and ‘culpable homicide not is amounting to murder’. The accused, Govinda was residing in Satara district of Maharashtra.
At the time of incident, his age was 18 years and his wife Balai’s age was 15 years. There was a quarrel between wife and husband. He knocked his wife, and put his one knee on the chest and struck two or three times on the face.
One or two of these blows took effect on her left eye, producing contusion and discolourisation. There happened no fracture of the skull, but the blow caused an extra vacation of blood on the brain and\he girt died in consequence, either on the spot, or very shortly afterwards.
Judgment:
The accused was held guilty of the crime of murder by the Sessions Judge. He convicted the accused under Sec. 302. The case came up before a Bench of two Judges of the Bombay High Court for confirmation of the death sentence.
As the Judges differed in opinion as to whether the facts constituted an offence of murder or an offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, the case was referred for the opinion to a third Judge, Melvill J. His Lordship held that the case came only within the provisions of culpable homicide not amounting to murder on the grounds that there was no intention to cause-death and that the bodily injury was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The High Court altered the conviction from Sec. 302 to Sec. 304.
G. K.M. Nanavati vs. State of Maharashtra (AIR 62 SC 605)
Brief Facts:
Nanavathi was working as Second in Command in Navy. His wife’s name was Sylvia. They had three children. While Nanavati was on tour, his wife Sylvia had illicit contact with one Prem Bhagwan Pass Ahuja, a businessman in Bombay. Ahuja was a bachelor of 34 years; he had illicit contacts with several other women. When Navavati returned to house after duty, he noticed the change in the conduct of his wife.
He asked her for the reasons. She confessed to Nanavathi that she had illicit intimacy with Prem Bhagwan Dass Ahuja. Nanavathi did not tell anything to his wife Sylvia. He went directly to the residence of Ahuja and asked him to marry Sylvia and would divorce her, and he would look after the three children.
Ahuja said that he could not marry Sylvia and he also told that if he would marry the women like this it would become a big list. Nanavati got enraged at the behaviour of Ahuja. He went to his ship. He took from the store of the ship a revolver and six cartridges on a false pretext, loaded the same.
From the ship he went directly to the residence of Ahuja and entered his bed room and shot him dead. Thereafter he surrendered himself to the police.
Judgment:
The question arose whether the act of the accused would be treated as culpable homicide or murder. The trial Court convicted the accused under Section 302 and passed sentence of death.
It was confirmed by the High Court. The Supreme Court held that it was a deliberate and calculated murder. The act of the accused would not attract the provisions of Section 299 and the five exceptions to Sec. 300.
However, the Supreme Court altered the conviction and imposed imprisonment for life under Sec. 302 of I.P.C. This case had created sensation in India. The press and family members submitted the petition to the President of India under Art. 72 to pardon the accused being a sincere and obedient public servant.
Before the President decided on the petition, Nanavati accepted the sentence of imprisonment of life and expressed his willingness for the conviction.
H. Salebhai Kadar Ali vs. Emperor (2, AICD 53)
The deceased was stabbed in the abdomen by the accused with a knife, and the deceased died due to gangrene and paralysis of intestines. It was held that if an operation would have had taken place within an hour of the infliction of the abdominal injury the life of the deceased might have been saved. The Court held that it was culpable homicide not amounting to murder, and thus convicted the accused under Sec. 304 Part-1.
I. Virsa Singh vs. State (AIR 1958 SC 465)
Subject:
Sec. 300 “Thirdly” what is to be proved before a case comes within the purview of Sec. 300 “Thirdly”.
Brief Facts:
Appellant Virsa Singh at about 8 p.m. on 13-7-1955 along with five other accused caused death of Khem Singh by using spears, etc. Khem Singh died on 14-7-1955 at 5 p.m. There was only one injury on Khem Singh as examined by the doctor during his life time was described by him as “a punctured wound 2″ X1/2″ transverse in direction on the left side of the abdominal wall in the lower part of the iliac region just above the inguinal canal”.
Three coils of intestines were coming out of the wound. The Sessions Judge convicted Virsa Singh under Sec. 302, and the judgment was upheld by the High Court. The Accused/Appellant preferred an appeal to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court held that when the four elements of Sec. 300 were present in a murder case, the accused shall be punished without any excuse. In this case four elements were present and established. Hence the appeal was dismissed.
J. Shankar vs. State (AIR 1979 SC 1532)
Death occurred on account of dagger injury caused on the neck. Occurrence took place without any premeditation while the deceased along with the accused and others, had finished meals. Held that the accused could not be said to have any intention to cause the particular injury on the vital part. The conviction under Sec. 302 I.P.C. was changed to one under Sec. 304.
K. Ghansham Das vs. The State (AIR 1979 SC 44)
The deceased committed criminal trespass but he was not armed. There could have been no apprehension that death or grievous hurt was likely to be caused to the accused.
The accused attacked the deceased with deadly weapon, and caused his death. It was held that the accused exceeded his right of private defence of property by using dangerous weapon, with deadly effect and causing two injuries which cut the heart and lung. Hence he was guilty of an offence under Sec. 304 I.P.C.
L. Willie (William) Slaney vs. State of M.P. (AIR.1956 SC 116)
Brief Facts:
Willie (William) Slaney and the co-accused Ronnie Slaney were brothers. Willie aged 22 years loved one of the sisters of D. Smythe. Smythe did not like it. He warned Willie on the day of incident, i.e., 12-2-1953 at about 7.00 p.m., when Willie and Ronnie went to the house of Mrs. Waters (another sister of Smythe) located at Civil Lines, Jabalpur.
Smythe was present there at that time. He asked the accused why they came there. There were exchanges of heat discussions. Smythe slapped Willie. Willie snatched a Hockey stick from Ronnie and beat Smythe.
Smythe became unconscious. He was taken to hospital. After ten days Smythe died in the hospital. Mrs. Waters (P.W.-20) sister of the deceased and some other persons were the witnesses.
The Police prosecuted both the accused under Sec. 302 read with Sec. 34. The trial Court acquitted Ronnie opining that the charges under Sec. 34 were not proved, but convicted the appellant to death sentence under Sec. 302.
He appealed to the High Court but in vain. He then appealed to the Supreme Court. His contention was that the co-accused was acquitted, so the element of common intention would be dropped.
Judgment:
The Supreme Court observed that the charges framed under Sec. 302 did not suit the present case. It opined that the appellant did not want to cause to death.
In a heated situation he beat Smythe and it resulted into the death. Hence the Supreme Court altered the punishment from Sec. 302 to Sec. 304, and imposed punishment of 5 years rigorous imprisonment on the appellant.
M. Shivaji Saheb Rao Bobade and Another vs. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1973 SC 2622)
Brief Facts:
There were two accused in this case. Shivaji was Accused No. 1. Lala Sahed was Accused No. 2. The prosecution was that on 26-9-1966, the two accused young person’s attacked Hariba, an old man aged 60 years, on a country road in Satara District. Both the accused stabbed Hariba.
While stabbing took place, there were several eye-witnesses. Hariba fell down on the ground and the accused went away. When P.W.-2 and other witnesses gathered there and tried to help the victim, he gave dying declaration to P.W.-2 and five eye-witnesses stating that the accused caused the stabbing. Before he was lifted to the hospital he died.
The trial Court acquitted the accused opining that there was no substantial evidence. On appeal by the State Government, the High Court set aside the judgment of Sessions Judge and imposed imprisonment of life on both the accused. The accused appealed to the Supreme Court.
Judgment:
The Supreme Court confirmed the conviction of sentence and dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court observed:
“Two men in their twenties thus stand convicted of murder and have to suffer imprisonment for life because the punitive strategy of our penal code does not sufficiently reflect the modern trends in correctional treatment and personalised sentencing. We do not wish to consider these facets as they fall outside our scope here.”
N. Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab (AIR 1980 SC 898)
O. Rajendra Prasad vs. State of U.P. (AIR 1979 SC 916)
P. B,N. Srikantaiah and Others vs. The State of Mysore (AIR 1958 SC 672)
Q. Juggan Khan vs. State of M.P. (AIR 1965 SC 831)
Brief Facts:
The accused was a registered Homeopathic Medical Practitioner. He started practising since May, 1960. He distributed pamphlets in the town that he would cure the chronic diseases including Naru (guinea worm).
Smt Deobi, aged 20 years, was lured by the advertisement, and she approached the accused for the treatment of guinea worm on 30-5-1961 at 8.00 a.m. The accused administered 24 drops of mother tincture and leaf of datura.
After taking the medicine Deobi started feeling restless and illness with stomach ache. She died at 5.00 p.m. on the same day. The accused was prosecuted under Sec. 302. The Sessions Judge convicted the accused under Sec. 302. On appeal, the High Court upheld with the judgment of the trial Court. He appealed to the Supreme Court.
Judgment: The Supreme Court held that the appellant caused death of Smt. Deobi by his rash and negligent conduct and he had no intention to cause the death of the patient. Hence the Supreme Court set aside the conviction under Sec. 302 and imposed conviction on the accused 2 years of rigorous imprisonment under Sec. 304-A.
R. Dahyabhai Chhanganbhai Thakkar vs. State of Gujarat (AIR 1964 SC 1563)
[This case-law is explained in Topic “Insanity”. Refer to it in that Topic.]
S. Jaidev vs. State of Punjab (AIR 1963 SC 612)
[This case-law is explained in Topic “Common Intention and Common Object”. Refer to it in that Topic.]
T. State of U.P. vs. Desh Raj (AIR 2006 SC 1712)
Brief Facts: The prosecution was that appellant/accused took a minor girl aged 10 years nearby agricultural fields at about 5 or 5.30 p.m., and raped and murdered her at about 7.00 p.m.
There were no eye witnesses, but only circumstantial evidence, and the medical evidence. The trial Court convicted the accused/appellant under Sections 302 and 376. On appeal, the High Court acquitted him. The State appealed to the Supreme Court.
Judgment:
The Supreme Court confirmed the trial Court’s decision.
U. Problem:
A and B, two accused are prosecuted under Section 304 read with Section 34. While the prosecution is going on, A dies. Shall the proceedings against B be stopped? Can the Court alter the Sections? Decide.
Solution:
For the first question, the prosecution shall proceed against B. For the second question, the Court is empowered to alter Sections depending upon the evidence adduced.
The given problem is identical with case “Badasaheb Murlidhar vs. State of Maharashtra (2006) 10 SCC 309”. In that case, A, B and C, the accused attacked the deceased.
The post-mortem report showed that deceased received several injuries on vital parts of the body and head injury. The prosecution proved that head injury was caused by C. The trial Court convicted the accused were convicted under Section 304 Part-II.
During the pendency of appeal before the High Court, A died and his appeal was abated. The High Court acquitted B, but convicted C with imprisonment for life under Section 302 read with Section 34. C appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court dismissed his appeal and held that the High Court is justified in altering the conviction of appellant from Section 304 Part-II read with Section 34 to Section 302 read with Section 34.
X. Punishment for murder by life convict: Section 303 says that whoever, being under sentence of imprisonment for life, commits murder, shall be punished with death. The Supreme Court struck down this Section, while giving the judgment in Mithu vs. State (1984 CrLJ 811 SC) It opined that Section 303 is against the Articles 14 & 21 of the Constitution of India. Hence This Section is not in force now.
V. D.P.P. vs. Camplin (1978) (2) All Eng. P.168)
Brief Facts:
The accused was a 15 years boy. The deceased provoked the boy. In response to it, the boy had beaten the deceased causing his death. The trial Court convicted the boy under Section 3 of Homide Act, 1957 (which is equal to Sec. 302 of I.P.C). On appeal the Appellant Court too confirmed the trial Court’s decision. The accused appealed to the House of Lords.
Judgment:
The House of Lords admitted the appeal and altered the conviction from murder to culpable homicide.
Principle:
The House of Lords observed: “We think that the test of provocation should be reformulated so that the accused in judged with due regard to any disability, physical or mental from which he suffered. In our view, in place of the reasonable man test.
There should be a requirement that provocation is sufficient, if, on the facts as they appeared to the accused, it constitutes a reasonable excuse for the loss of self -control on his part. Such a test would be more liberal than the present law. In particular it would enable any physical characteristics of the accused to be taken into account.”
W. Problem:
A killed B and severed the head. A threw the head in a tank with the intention that nobody shall identify the dead body. Discuss.
Solution:
The given problem is identical with case “Major Singh vs. State of Punjab (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 118)”. In that case, there were previous enmity existed due to suspicion about commission of murder of accused’s sister by deceased. The accused attacked the deceased, killed and severed the head of the deceased and threw it in tank.
The police prosecuted the accused under Sections 302 (Murder) and 201 (Causing disappearance of evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender).
The trial Court convicted the accused. He appealed to the High Court, which too confirmed the conviction. He appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court too confirmed the conviction.