Section 111 of IPC – “Liability of abettor when one act abetted and different act done.”
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When an act is abetted and a different act is done, the abettor is liable for the act done, in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had directly abetted it :
ADVERTISEMENTS:
Provided the act done was a probable consequence of the abetment, and was committed under the influence of the instigation, or with the aid or in pursuance of the conspiracy which constituted the abetment.
Illustrations:
(a) A instigates a child to put poison into the food of Z, and gives him poison for that purpose. The child, by mistake, puts poison into the food of Y, which is by the side of that of Z. Here, if the child was acting under the influence of A’s instigation and the act done was probable consequence of such instigation, A is liable in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had instigated the child to put the poison in the food of Y.
(b) A instigated B to burn Z’s house. B sets fire to the house and at the same time commits theft of property there. A, though guilty of abetting the burning of the house is not guilty of abetting the theft; for the theft is a distinct act, and not probably a consequence of the burning.
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(c) A instigates B and C to commit robbery at midnight and provides them with arms for that purpose. B and C commit robbery in which they are resisted by Z whom they murder. Here, if the murder was the probable consequence of abetment, A is liable to the punishment provided for murder.
Section 111 is based on the maxim ‘every man is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his act’. Under this section, if an act is abetted, and the abetment takes the form of instigation of an act, and a different act is done, that different act must be probable consequence and committed under the influence of the instigation; and where the abetment takes the form of aiding or a conspiracy, the different act must be a probable consequence and also with the aid or in pursuance of the conspiracy.
For example X and V conspire to assault Z and during the assault Z’s friend A intervenes, and Y stabs A and thus causes grievous hurt. X neither instigated Y to stab A, nor did he aid in such stabbing.
X is not liable under the section, because assuming that it was a probable consequence, it cannot be said that the stabbing of A was in consequence of the conspiracy to assault Z. To prove so this section requires two essentials —(i) the act done must be a probable consequence of the abetment, and (ii) the act done was committed under the influence of the instigation or with the aid or in pursuance of the conspiracy which constituted the abetment.
ADVERTISEMENTS:
A probable consequence of an act is one which is likely or which can reasonably be expected to follow from such an act. Where the consequence of an act is such in nature that no reasonable man could be expected to foresee, such consequence cannot be described as probable one.
For example, A instigates B to burn C’s house and B in so doing commits robbery in house of C. Here, A would be liable as abettor to the burning but not for robbery because robbery is not the probable consequence of the act abetted.