The expression “confession” has not been defined in the Evidence Act. A confession is a statement which either admits the offence, or at any rate, substantially all the facts which constitute the offence. Stephen in his Digest of Law of Evidence, defines if thus: “A Confession is an admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime, stating or suggesting an inference that he committed the crime.”This definition was adopted by the Courts in India in a number of cases.
The above definition suggested by Stephen was modified by the Privy Council, which held that only a direct acknowledgement of guilt should be regarded as a confession. A confession must either admit the offence or at least substantially all the facts which constitute the offence. (Narayan Swami v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1939 P.C. 47)
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But, Straight J. in R. v. Jagrup (7 All. 646) held that only statements which are direct acknowledgement of guilt could be regarded as confessions, and the term cannot be construed to include a mere inculpatory admission which falls short of being an admission of guilt. A similar opinion was also expressed by Chandavarkar J. in R. v. Santtya Bandhu (11 Bom. 633).
The meaning of the term ‘confession’ is made clear by the decision of the Supreme Court in Palvinder v. State, (A.I.R. 1952, S.C. 354). Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, relying upon the pronouncement of the Judicial Committee in Pakala Narayana v. R., (66 I.A. 66), reiterated the view that the word ‘confession’, as used in the Evidence Act, cannot be construed as meaning a statement by an accused suggesting an inference that he committed the crime.
A confession must either admit, in terms, the offence, or at any rate, substantially all the facts, which constitute the offence. An admission of a gravely inculpatory fact, or even a conclusively inculpatory fact, is not by itself a confession. The same principle was applied by the Supreme Court in Оm Prakash v. State of U.P. (A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 409).
The Supreme Court, in Sahool v. State of U.P. (A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 40), confirmed the above definition, and further observed as follows:
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“Admissions and confessions are exceptions to the hearsay rule. The Evidence Act places them in the category of relevant evidence, presumably on the ground that, as they are declarations against the interest of the person making them, they are probably true. The probative value of an admission or a confession does not depend upon its communication to another, though just like any other piece of evidence, it can be admitted in evidence only on proof. This proof, in the case of oral admission or confession, can be offered only by witness who heard the admission or confession, as the case may be”.
The following observations of the Orissa High Court in Gadhapurni v. The State, (1980 Cr. L. J. 188), on when an admission amounts to a confession are relevant:
“To make admission a confession., it must amount to a clear acknowledgement of guilt. A confession must relate to the particular crime with which the accused is charged. Any admission which is not connected with any of the ingredients of the offence charged would not amount to a confession.”
The Orissa High Court has held that a confession must be addressed to some person. So, if the accused goes around the village shouting that he had killed his wife, this would not amount to a confession. (Pandu Khadia v. State of Orissa, 1992 Cri. L. J. 762)
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Likewise, a confession before an assembly of villagers called for confronting the accused does not amount to a “confession”. (Judumani Khanda v. The State, 1993 Cri. L. J. 2701)
Probative Value of Confession:
Though the presumption that a person will not make an untrue statement against his own interest is the basis of receiving confessions as evidence, yet it must be noted that the evidential value of a confession is not very great. As observed by Best, a confession may be false due to mental aberration, mistake of law, to escape physical or moral torture, to escape ignominy of a stifling enquiry, due to vanity, peculiar relationship between sexes, to escape military duty by getting as conviction, to save the life, fortune or reputation or suffering of a party whose interests are dear to the prisoner, to endanger others by naming them as co-offenders, and so on.
Therefore, confessions may not always be true. They must be checked in the light of the whole of the evidence on the record, in order to see if they carry conviction. It would be very dangerous to act on a confession put into the mouth of the accused by a witness and uncorroborated from any other source. (White v. R., 1945, PC. 181)
Bose J. has observed, in Muthuswamy v. State of Madras, (A.I.R. 1954 S.C.47), that a confession should not be accepted, merely because it contains a wealth of details. Unless the main features of the story are shown to be true, it is unsafe to regard mere wealth of uncorroborated details as a safeguard of truth. The Supreme Court has also observed that, normally speaking, it would not be safe as a matter of prudence, if not of law, to base a conviction for murder on a confession by itself.
In Sahoo v. State of U.P. (A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 40), it was held by the Supreme Court that there is a clear distinction between the asmissibility of evidence and the weight to be attached to it. A confessional soliloquy is a direct piece of evidence. It may be an expression of conflict or emotion, or an argument to find excuse or justification for his act, or a conscious effort to stifle a pricked conscience, or a penitent or remorseful act of exaggeration of his part in the crime.
A confession may consist of several parts, and may reveal not only the actual commission of the crime, but also the motive, the preparation, the opportunity, the provocation, weapons used, the intention, concealment of the weapon and the subsequent conduct of the accused. If the confession is tainted, the taint attaches to each part of it.
It is not permissible in law to separate one part and to admit it in evidence as a non-confessional statement. Each part discloses some incriminating fact, i.e., some fact which by itself or along with other admitted or proved facts, suggests the inference that the accused committed the crime, and though each part taken singly may not amount to a confession, each of them being part of the confessional statement, partakes of the character of the confession.
If a statement contains an admission of an offence, not only that admission, but also every other admission of an incriminating fact contained in the statement, is part of the confession. If proof of the confession is excluded by any provision of law, the entire confessional statement, in all its parts, including the admissions of minor incriminating facts, must also be excluded, unless proof of it is permitted by some other section. (A. Nagesia v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 119)
Confessions and admissions must either be accepted as a whole or rejected as a whole, and the Court is not competent to accept only the inculpatory part, while rejecting the exculpatory part as incredible (Palvinder Kaurv. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 354), unless there is other evidence on record to show the falsity of the exculpatory part, and besides the confession, there are other materials on the record establishing or indicating the guilt of the accused. Thus, the inculpatory part by itself cannot form the sole basis for conviction, even if there are other materials on the record to show the falsity of the exculpatory part. (Kamalashanker v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1961 Guj. 312)
If an admission of an accused is to be used against him, the whole of it should be tendered in evidence, and if part of the evidence is exculpatory and part inculpatory, the prosecution is not at liberty to use in evidence the inculpatory part only. The accused is entitled to insist that the entire admission, including the exculpatory part, must be tendered in evidence. (A. Nagesia v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 119)