When a person has —
By his
(i) Declaration
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(ii) Act, or
(iii) Omission
Intentionally caused or permitted or another person
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(i) To believe a thing to be true, and
(ii) To act upon such belief,—
Neither (i) he, nor (ii) his representative can be allowed to deny the truth of that thing in a suit or proceeding between himself and such person or his representative.
Illustration:
ADVERTISEMENTS:
A intentionally and falsely leads В to believe that certain land belongs to A, and A seeks to set aside the sale on the ground that at the time of the sale, he had no title. He must not be allowed to prove his want to title.
Principle of Section 115:
Estoppel is based on the principle that it would be most inequitable and unjust that if one person, by a representation, or by conduct amounting to a representation, has induced another to act as he would not otherwise have done, the person who made the representation should be allowed to deny or repudiate the effect of his former statement, to the loss and injury of the person who acted on it.
Sir Edward Coke had defined estoppel in these words: An estoppel exists “where a man’s own act or acceptance stoppeth or closeth up his mouth to allege or plead the truth.” In simpler language, a person cannot be allowed to say one thing at one time and the contrary at another: He cannot blow both hot and cold at the same time.
This section is founded upon the doctrine laid down in Pickard v. Sears (1837 6A. & E. 475), namely, that where a person “by his words or conduct, wilfully causes another to believe the existence of a certain state of things, and induces him to act on that belief, so as to alter his own previous position, the former is concluded from averring against the latter, a different state of things as existing at the same time.” This doctrine precludes a person from denying the truth of some statement previously made by himself. No cause of action arises upon estoppel itself.
Scope of Section 115:
In order to hold that a case comes within the scope of this section, a Court must find:
1. That A believed a thing to be true.
2. That in consequence of that belief, he acted in a particular manner.
3. That that belief, and A’s so acting were brought about by some representation by S, either by a declaration, act, or omission, which representation was made intentionally to produce that result.
If the above three points are established, В is prohibited by law from denying the truth of his representation in a proceeding by or against A or A’s representative.
It may be noted that it is not necessary to prove any fraudulent intention on B‘s part. He will be nonetheless estopped if he himself was acting under a mistake or misapprehension.
The section does not apply where the statement relied upon is made to a person who knows the true facts and is not misled by the untrue statement. There can be no estoppel if true facts are known to both the parties. Therefore, if A knew the true facts, no estoppel arises.
In Chhaganlal Mehta v. Haribhai Patel, [(1982) 1 S.C.C. 223 ], the Supreme Court analysed the scope of S. 115 of the Act, and laid down that the following eight conditions must be satisfied to bring a case within the scope of estoppel, as defined in S. 115.
(i) There must have been a representation by a person (or his authorised agent) to another person. Such a representation may be in any form — a declaration or an act or an omission.
(ii) Such representation must have been of the existence of a fact, and not of future promises or intention.
(iii) The representation must have been meant to have been relied upon.
(iv) There must have been belief on the part of the other party in its truth.
(v) There must have been some action on the faith of that declaration, act or omission. In other words, such declaration, act or omission must have actually caused the other person to act on the faith of it, and to alter his position to his prejudice or detriment.
(vi) The misrepresentation or conduct or omission must have been the proximate cause of leading the other party to act to his prejudice.
(vii) The person claiming the benefit of an estoppel must show that he was not aware of the true state of things. There can be no estoppel if such a person was aware of the true state of affairs or if he had means of such knowledge.
(viii) Only the person to whom the representation was made or for whom it was designed (or his representative) can avail of the doctrine.
There are four сlasses of estoppel to be found in section 116 and 117 of the Act, viz., estoppel of —
1. Tenant (Section 116)
No tenant of immovable property (or person claiming through such tenant) can, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the land-lord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property.
2. Licensee of a person in possession (Section 116)
No person who came upon immovable property by the licence of the person in possession thereof can deny that such person had a title to such possession at the time when such licence was given.
3. Acceptor of a bill of exchange (Section 117)
No acceptor of a bill of exchange can deny that the drawer had authority to draw such bill or to endorse it; but he may deny that the bill was really drawn by the person by whom it purports to have been drawn.
4. Bailee or licensee (Section 117):
No bailee or licensee can deny that his bailor or licensor had, at the time when the bailment or licence commenced, authority to make such bailment or grant such licence. But, if a bailee delivers the goods bailed to a person other than the bailor, he may prove that such person had a right to them as against the bailor.