Legal provisions regarding Disturbing Religious Assembly under section 296 of Indian Penal Code, 1860.
Disturbing Religious Assembly:
“Whoever voluntarily causes disturbance to any assembly lawfully engaged in the performance of religious worship, or religious ceremonies, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both”.
ADVERTISEMENTS:
The following are the essential ingredients of Section 296:
i) There must be assembly which is engaged in the performance of religious worship or religious ceremonies,
ii) Such assembly and performance of religious ceremony should be lawful,
ADVERTISEMENTS:
iii) The accused must cause disturbance to such assembly,
iv) The accused must do so voluntarily.
Congregational worship or the performances of religious ceremonies are protected by Section 296 from intentional disturbance. Section 296 does not cover individual worship. A religious procession may be regarded as lawful assembly engaged in performance of religious worship. Thus, any disturbance caused to a lawful religious procession will be an offence under Section 296.
The object of Section 296 is to secure freedom from molestation when people meet for the performance of acts in a quiet spot vested for the time in the assembly exclusively, and not when they engage in worship in an unquiet place, open to all the public as a thorough fare.
ADVERTISEMENTS:
When a mosque is abutting on a highway, going in a procession with music at a time when prayer is going on in the mosque, will be an offence, as such music will necessarily disturb the congregation engaged in the prayer. However, disturbance caused to a procession through a private grave does not warrant Section 296.
Persons of every sect are entitled to take out religious processions with music through public streets provided that they do not interfere with the ordinary use of the streets by the public or contravene any traffic regulation or lawful directions issued by the Magistrate. A religious procession does not change its character merely because the music is temporarily stopped in front of a mosque.
The same rule applies to worshippers in a Hindu temple. All worshippers have an equal right to recite mantras, and the fact that the recitation of one is overheard by and causes disturbance to the others cannot deprive the former of his communal right to a joint worship. The rule, however, would be different if the temple was a private area in which the priest had the exclusive right of chanting mantras.
But, apart from such privilege, which must be asserted and proved by those who rely upon it, no worshipper, whether a Hindu or a Mohammedan, can arrogate to himself the right of controlling the mode of performance of prayers by the others. Any disturbance the latter may cause would not then be ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of Section 296.
The case of denominational Christian churches is, of course different. There is no one but the officiating minister who has the right to preach or pray, and the audience must presumably conform to the rituals of the church then elect to attend.
But the fact that a disturbance is caused does not necessarily make the accused liable for it, for in order to fasten upon him the liability imposed by Section 296, it should be a disturbance in every case caused voluntarily which means willingly and on purpose, maliciously, contemptuously or by any other unlawful ways or means.
In Kolimi Mahabub Sahib v. Sri Sidheswaraswami temple at Dwalampeta [AIR 1945 Mad 496], it was observed that playing of music before mosque would not, by itself without anything further, amount to an offence within the meaning of Section 296. Any deliberate disturbance is necessary; but surely it must be found as a fact, before Section 296 can apply that there was a substantial and not merely fanciful disturbance of the worship.
The offence under Section 296 is cognizable but summons should ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is bailable but not compoundable, and is triable by any Magistrate.