The propriety of making conscience the standard of moral judgment depends, to a large extent, upon assumptions regarding its nature. If it is to be treated as similar to sense knowledge, bereft of any reason, as is the case with the moral sense school, then many difficulties become manifest.
The main difficulties are:
(1) Thought is necessary in moral judgment:
Moral judgment cannot be made to rid itself of the place it has given to thinking. At many points of religious upheaval, the conscience cannot immediately give a decision whence it becomes necessary to resort to thought
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(2) Intuition cannot be the basis of morality:
ADVERTISEMENTS:
This theory reduces moral value to a mere intuition. Lacking the element of reason, it becomes difficult to decipher the means by which moral intuition differs from other feelings. Intuition cannot supply us with any universal standard, because intuition too, is changeable with time and place.
A number of feelings of different people can be seen on the subject of morality of the same act. Such a satisfaction makes it difficult to alight upon the correct and real judgment
(3) Subjective moral judgment:
This theory makes moral judgments subjective. Judgments cannot be objective when reason is absent. How can the conscience judge the goodness or badness in the absence of a conception of the ultimate good?
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Moral judgments cannot depend upon feelings or sentiments. In the absence of reason, feelings or sentiments will be blind. This theory cannot interpret the purification or transformation of the conscience.