The new scientific outlook, as a result of fact-value dichotomy, helped in a great measure to the growth of ‘science of politics’ movement geared to sophisticated scientific methodology.
“It is not saying too much,” remarked Arnold Brecht, “that ours has become the methodological century in the social sciences.”
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The scientific study of Political Science is popularly known as political behaviouralism. It is, however, important to note that most of the scholars who subscribe to this approach constitute a heterogeneous group united only by dissatisfaction with the traditional Political Science.
But we are here essentially concerned with those behaviouralists who subscribe to its scientific credo and obviously the fundamental assumptions that underlie it. For example, David Truman, David Easton and many others of their like.
Truman contends that the new approach deals with the verified principles of human behaviour “through the use of methods similar to those of natural sciences.” Similarly, David Easton observed that despite shifts in emphasis, the underlying assumption of the behaviouralists is the same to build “a science of politics modeled after the methodological assumptions of the natural sciences”.
Under the impact of ‘behavioural’ or ‘scientific’ approach vigorous attempts have been made to render Political Science of the order of Physics and Chemistry. There has been significant increase in the use of empirical and quantitative methods and attempts to evolve conceptual frameworks, models, theories, meta theories, and paradigms.
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Consequently, Political Science appears to have drifted away from the reality of the World and is lost in facts and data. “Political scientists, especially the behaviouralists, like the heroes of Turgeneev’s Fathers and Sons believe that science would solve all problems and cure all ills.”
Thus, the scientific movement which had arrived to take Political Science “away” from “dogma” — from religious dogma as well as from dogmas of national tradition or of personal conviction—and on to reality” was lost in the dogma of science and the “ideology of no ideology.”
The new group of social scientists “favouring a non-ideological” science of society whom Alfred Weber called the “socially unattached intellectuals” and Karl Manneheim named “free floating” “classless aggregation” failed to fulfill the aim of carrying forward the tradition of science.
Post-behaviouralism:
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It was soon realised that the development of a pure science of Politics was a cry for the moon. Micro studies, as formed the basis of their research, did not measure up to the ideal as the level of generality was sure to be low. Leo Strauss charged political scientists with the error of absolutizing the relative. It was also pointed out, and quite relevantly, that their researches lacked objectivity. Even in the selection of research problems reflected bias. And as for the interpretation of data, personal preferences importantly played their role.
It is very difficult for a researcher “to mark off his two different roles: as a scientist concerned with a dispassionate analysis of facts and as a citizen clinging to his preferences while participating in political activities. He is, however, charged with what is called “existential schizophrenia.”
Political Science, thus, pushed out of reality became merely an academic discipline “disengaged from facts.” It was then abundantly apparent that behavioural approach is similar to the philosophical irrelevance.
In 1969, David Easton declared the end of the behavioural revolution and the beginning of a new era in the study of Politics; an era popularly called Post-behaviouralism. Its main thesis is “relevance” and “action.” This approach renewed the interest in and appreciation of the classics of Political Philosophy.
For example, in reply to the statement that political scientists should give ethics to the philosophers and concern primarily with the description and analysis of political behaviour, behaviouralists of the rank of Almond replied that leaving ethics to philosophers was not desirable. “Practical judgment of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ in the area of public policy is the special responsibility of social scientists.”
The behaviouralists had realised that hitherto they had failed to comprehend that facts and values are closely intertwined with each other and that, in Political Science, one cannot separate them except in very trivial circumstances and instances. This realization led them to the Post-behavioural era.
In fact, the very concept of value-free scientific inquiry is “a farce and is misleading.” Certain values and norms are always present in any social research. H.R.G Greaves argues that a value-free Political Science is a myth and that “it has been insufficiently understood how far description in this field is independent for significance upon analysis and explanation into which values enter.”
A social scientist who claims to engage himself in the kinds of value-free research practised by the chemist or biologist only befools himself and his readers for as Leo Strauss points out: “The value judgments which are forbidden to enter through the front door of Political Science enter through the back door.”
To sum up, the post-behaviouralist movement in Political Science has reopened the issue of fact-value separation. According to this school of thought, political scientists need not abdicate the spirit of their discipline at the altar of science or any other empiricism.
“Moderate empiricism, sound analytical techniques, carefully chosen terminology, self- conscious attention to logical inferences, quantification, and the use of scientific data, are useful. But too much obsession with science would kill the spirit of the discipline.”
It is, accordingly, not prudent to abandon science, but to simply put it to better way and use. Kaplan rightly believes that “if a man fails to consider moral and political questions seriously, he may reduce himself and his progeny to an ugly and distasteful, if not brutal, animalist.” Thus, values must be studied as values, not scientifically and yet scientifically.”